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Summary findings
Hoekman and Mavroidis explore the possibility  of  to determine the contestability  of the relevant markets.
governments' seeking  to agree to apply competition-  Their proposal does not involve  harmonization  of
policy-based  considerations  and disciplines  in addressing  competition laws.
unfair-trade allegations  before turning to "standard"  All  that would changc from the status quo is chat  a
antidumping remedies.  neccessarylcondition  for an antidumping action is that
The premise of proponents of antidumping actions is  competition authorities find that the exporting firm's
that the cxistence  of market power in exporters' home  home market is not contestable, and conclude that no
markets, or potential market dominance in the importing  remedial action is possible  through the application of
(host) market, is an important source of perceived  competition law.
"unfairness." But antidumping  authorities do not  Ideally,  agreement along these lines would be sought in
investigate  the existence  of such situations.  the mulrilatcral (GATI) context, but bilateral or regional
Hockman and Mavroidis proposw  that allegations  of  tradc agreements could also be concluded. For example,
dumping first be investigated  by competition authorities  European Union cooperation or association  agreements
might be extended along the lines proposed.
This paper - a product of the Europe and Central Asia,  Middle East and North Africa  Regions  Technical Department,
Private Sector and Finance  Team  - is parr of a lager  effort ro monitor and analyze  developments  in global trade policy
affecting  the Europe and Central Asia  and the Middle East  and North Africa  regions.  Copies of the paper are available  free
from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Plcasc  contact Faten Hatab, room H8-087, extension
35835 (29 pages).  August  1994.
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papers  cary the  names  of the  authors  and  shosd  bhe  wed  and  citedaccordinsgy.  The  findings  ntrpretains.  and  condunare the
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This paper exlores  the possibility  of sekling multilateral  agre  t  to implement  competition
oticy-based  aoiderato  nd disciplines  in the context  of 'unfair trade' allegations  before tuning to
andard  anuidumping  rmedies.  The paper  builds on the argumes  of ppones  of aiduing  ations
vho defend  it as a second  best solution  to the exploitation  of excessive  market  power  by exporting  firms.
implifyimg  somewhl  , the argument  that is made is that exporting  firm  are able to price-discriminate
md/or seU below cost because they benfit  from a sheltred,  on-contestable home market.  In many
stances the  iplicit  claim is that tie  barriers to contesing the exporter's home market stem from the
o-enforcement of local competiion laws, from a decision (tacit or formal) to exempt certain practices
rom  dLe  reach  of  competition policy  disciplime,  or  from  the  inaq  of  acopeti
a.ws/enforcment.
it is somes  mainined  by proponents  of antiduping  remedies  that the first best solution
voud be the application  of comon  co  on  ls.  Whatever  the merits of this proposition it is
perceived  to be impracticaible,  epecially in the multilatel  contex.  This paper accepts  that
remise.  Hanizion  is a very far-recing  approach,  and can be argued to be unne  ry in any
vent. The role of competition  policy  disciplines  in the unir atrade context  can  be substantially  enanced
rough  positive comity. This paper proposes a scheme  whereby allegais  of dming  mlst first be
ivest  by  the  coeon  authorties  of  the  two countries cocened  before  idummg
avestgadons  can be launched. A corollary  of the 'm;rket closure' justification  for antidmping offerd
y propones-  whatever  its economic  merits  - is that the existence  of market  power in exporter's  home
awkets,  or potential market don  in the  importing, host  marwt  should be a  criterion in
v;estgons.  The competition  authorites of the exortes  home coutry  should then seek to
etermine  whete  the exporting  firm or incislty engages  in antiolpetitive  practices  or benefits  from
overument-created  or sWorted  entry barriers. Concurrently,  the compeitio  office  of the importing-
Dmpeting  industry petioning  for antidumping would determine whether the domestic market is
*mesable.
The importing  country's competition  authorities  should be kept  fully  informed  of the investigadon
ad findings  of the exporting  country's auorities  and would  be provided  wih all relevant  data  collected
ad used. If an exporter  is found  by its coxpetition authorities  to violate  the aplicable comptition law,
andard remedies will be applied, consiset  with the law and practice.  If the importing country's
anpetdon  authories  find the relevant market not to be competitive  and contestable, this would
m,nstitute  evidence  that dumping,  if it occurred, is not a danger to competition. While the co  on
LW  of fte exporter's home courty  is unikey  to be perfect in the eyes of the importing  country, both
legal and economic  case  can  be made for limiting  the  application  of competition  laws to their respective
mritDries.
The proposal avoids any need for harmoization.  This calls for  anisms that allov the
ievitable  disagreemes regarding  the  findings  of the  antitrust  invesftigaon  in the exporte's home  arwket
be addressed. If the impordng  country's competion autdhiid  disagree  with the conclus  of the
Evestigation  by the exportes  competition  authorities,  the govrernmet of the former has the option  ofI is then  left to multilateral  miehanisms  to determine  the facts  of the case,  i.e., whether  the government
supports  or tolerates  ani-competidve  behavior,  and whether  this has a detrimental  effect.
Alternatively,  if the investigation  by the exporter's competition  authorities  has revealed  the
---  eistence  of barriers to entry in the exporter's bome market, but these do not violate the law, an
antidunping action  may be started  by the importing  country. Although  in such circumstances  a non-
violation  complaint  is preferable  from an economic  welfare  and  systemic  perspective,  if the government
concerned  is willing  to accede  to the request  for antidumping  by the import-compedng  lobby, it should
be able to do so.  All that would  change  in comparison  to the status  quo is that a necessary  condition  for
*;:  antidumping  is a finding  by the competition  authorities  that the exportng firm's home market is not
contestable,  and  the conclusion  that  no remedial  action  is possible  through  the application  of competition
law.
While  ideally  agreement  along these  lines  would  be sought in the multilateral  (GAIT) context,
bilateral  or regional  trade  agreements  could  also  be pursued. EU Cooperation  or Association  agreements
might  be extended  along  the lines  proposed. There is increasingly  a perception  that many countries  are
interested  in joining regional agrements so as to 'safeguard' their access to the regional market.
However,  recent  agreements  (e.g., the Europe  Agreements)  maintain  aneidumping  and  future  agreements
with other  partners  are likely  to do so as well. While  accepting  that 'political  realities'  may  prevent  the
aboliton of antidumping  in such  agreements,  the far-reaching  liberalization  that is achieved  under  them
should  at least allow  something  along  the lines  suggested  to be implemented.
..Antitrust-based  Remedies  and Dumping  in  iternatonal  Trade
L  Introduction
The recently concluded  Uruguay round of multilateral  trade negotiations, once fully implemented,
will lead to substantial liberalization of global trade flows.  In conjunction with ongoing restruuring,
liberalization, and privatinzton programs in major developing and former centrally-planned  economies,
adjustment  pressures in OECD countries will increase. As the Uruguay round also includes a prohibition
on the further use of voluntary export restraint agreements, the resulting lobbying for protection can be
expected  to focus largely  on antidumping.  This  is already  the instrment of choice  for industries  seeking
to  reduce competition from imports, some 2,000 cases having been initiated since 1980 by OECD
countries.  Disciplining this trade instrument will be among the most important 'market access' issues
facing policynakers  in the post-Uruguay round world.  The protectionist biases that are inherent in the
application of antidumping  are well known, but economists have not had much impact on weakening its
political support.  Relatively little was achieved in the Uruguay round in this connection.
Long before it was known whether the Uruguay Round would be  concluded successfully,
commentators were calling for the multilateral trading system to be  extended to cover competition
(antitrust) policies.  This reflected concerns tht  policies - or the lack of policies - in this area could
effectively restrict access to  markets, even if o'ert  trade barriers were low, thus granting exporters
located in these markets an 'unfair' advantage. The use of antidumping is to a large extent jusfified on
the basis of such considerations.  This  paper explores how a  negotiated multilateral agreement to
intoduce  competition policy considerations  into the unfair trade realm might help to defiLse  both market
access-related disputes and limit the use of antidumpmg  actions, the instument  of choice for industries
seeking to reduce competition from imports. It is suggested that efforts be made to obtain agreement that
a lack of contestability  of an exporter's home market - as determined by a competition agency  - becomes
a precondition for an antidumping investigation. The objective here is to focus on determining whether
a perceived necessary condition for 'unfair trade' - i.e., market access restrictions - has been satisfied.'
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section H discusses the objectives and criteria used in
antidumping  and competition cases. Section m provides an overview of regional integrtion  agreements
where the  relationship between antitrust  and  antidumping bas been addressed,  i.e.,  the European
11  Of cowse, in practice  many  economists  would  argue  that antidumping  policies  have nothing  to do with
'unainess',  however  defined,  instead  constitting  straitforward  proetinm  WhBie  sympadtetic  to this
viewpoint,  it is not very helpful  hi movg  things  fiuther. This  paper therefore  takes at face value  the claims  of
defeders of antidumpmg  that it is intend  to address  an 'unfair trade practice'. The focus  of the papcr  on a
possible  inteional  agreement  to link antitrust  and antidumping  ditnguishes it from the litaure  emphasizng
the opporunities  for indLvidual  countries  to apply  antitrust-based  criteria  in the applicaon of their national
mtidumping  laws. See, e.g., Wood (1989),  Temple-Lang  (1990),  Boltuck  and Kaplan  (1993),  or Kelly  (1993).Economic  Community  (EEC),  where  no antidumping  duties  can  be imposed  by member  states  on  products
onginaung  in other member  states;  the European  Economic  Area (EEA), the Australia  New Zealand
Closer Economic  Relatio.-s  Trade Agrement (ANZCERTA),  where  the same applies,  and the North
American  Free Trade  Area  (NAFTA)  and  the recently  concluded  agreements  between  the European  Union
(EU) and  the Central  and Eastern  European  countries  (CEECs),  where  antidumping  continues  to exist.
The objective  of Section  Im  is to explore  what the regional  experience  suggests  regarding  the necessary
and  sufficient  conditions  for replacing  antidumping  with  antitrust. The  conclusion  that  is suggested  is that
any attempt  to achieve  this goal  in a multilateral  agreement  is doomed  to fail for the foreseeable  future.
In Section  IV a proposal  is developed  to enhance  the role of competition  policy  disciplines  in
the unfair trade context. The proposal  does not imply any harmonization  of competition  laws  or the
elimination  of antidumping  action  as a possible  remedy. It does, however,  go beyond  the requirements
of the current  GATT  Antidumping  Agreement  and the one that was negotiated  in the Uruguay  round.
Under  the proposal  antidumping  would  become  just one of three possible  remedies,  with its initiation
made  conditional  upon a finding  by the competition  authorities  that  the exporter  concerned  benefits  from
substantial  barriers to entry on its home market. Section V concludes  by noting that the suggested
approach  can also  be implemented  in the regional  context. There is increasingly  a perception  that many
countries  are interested  in joining regional  agreements  so as to 'safeguard'  their access  to the regional
market.  However, recent agreements  (e.g., the Europe Agreements,  but also NAFTA)  maintain
antidumping.  While  accepting  that 'political  realities'  may  prevent  the abolition  of antidumping  in such
agreements, the far-reaching  liberalization that is achieved  under them should at least allow sometbing
along the lines of the proposal to be implemented.
a-.  Antidu  g  and Antitrust
National  competition  policy can be defined  as the set of rules and disciplines  maintained  by
govermnuents  relating  either  to agreements  between  firms that restict competition  or to the abuse  of a
dominant  position  (including  attempts  to create  a dominant  position  through  merger). The underlying
objective  of competition  policy  in most  jurisdictions  tends  to be efficient  resource  allocation,  and thereby
the  maximization  of national  welfare.  Most  competition  laws  attempt  to attain  this  objective  by prohlbiting
the  abuse  of dominant  positions  (either  through  prohibition  or through  regulation),  and  forbidding  various
kinds  of competition-restricting  agreements  between  competitors.  The focus  of competition  laws is on
competition,  reflecting  the belief  - which  is extensively  supported  by empirical  evidence  - that vigorous
competition  is an effective  way  to foster  economic  efficiency.  Many  jurisdictions  recognize  that  specific
agreements  between firms that may reduce competition  could be efficiency  enhancing,  and make
allowance  for such agreements. However,  the burden  of proof in such instances  is usually  upon the
participants  in such  arrangements.
2The  objectives  underlying  trade  policy  contrast  starky  with  those  of  competton  la
Govenmen  pursue trade policies for a variety of reasons, including  as a means to raise revenue
protect  specific  industries  (wheher 'infant' "senile'  or other),  to shift  the terms  of trade,  to attain  cer
forign policy or security  goals, or simply  to restrict  the consumption  of specific  goods. Whatever
underlying  objecte,  an active  trade policy redistributes  income  between  segments  of the populatio
protecting  specific industries  and the factors of production  employed  there, and usually does so it
inefficiaent  m  r.  Trade policy is consequently  often inconsisent with the objectives underll
competition  policy.  The way this  iconsistency  is frequendy put is that  opition  law aim
protwting  competition  (and thus economic  efficiency),  while trade policy aims  at protecting  competl
(or factors  of production).
This is also the case for antidumping,  although  many of its defexders  regard it as thexan
of a trade policy that is  with the objectives  of competition  law. While this may have  been
case at the time anIdump  laws were firs written  (late 19th  and early  20th century),  ft is certainly
the case  anymore. The original  theoretcal rationae for antidumpi  law was  developed  by Viner (1%,
He  argued that  aidmping  may  be  needed to  proect  domestic consumers from  ;redat
(anti-competitive)  cuming.2 The fear was  Xt  a foreign firm (or cartel) could deliberately  p
products  low enough  to drive existing  domestic  fim  out of business,  then establish  a monopoly. 0
stablished,  the monopolist  could more than recoup  its losses  by exploiting  the resulting  zn'arkt  pou
For this scenario to be plausible, however, ffie  monopolst (carte) must not only eliminate  dome
competizian,  it must be able to prohibit entry by new (foreign)  competitors. For this to be possbl
must either establish  a global do  or it must convince  the 'host' govenn  to pursue a pol
stance dtt  tolerates or supports  entry restrictions (e.g., high tariff). 3 Both options are diffiwli
reaize,  and in practice cases of successful  predatory dumping reMaIund  Proponeb
antiduping often have  a different  definition  of predation  than the econo  one descnrbed  above. Tn
concern, implicitly  if not explicitly,  relates to the contimed existence  of national  firms that produc
ood. The fact that competition from other outside sources will in most realistic  U:es prey
the formation  of a monopoly  is conidered irrelevant. What matters is the mainte  of a dome
industry.
In addition to 'ptedation', advocates  of antidumping  policies also argue hat antming  i
justifiablk  attempt  by importing  coutry  governments  to offset the market  access restrictions  existing
an exportg  firm's home coutry  that underlie  the ability  of such firms to dump. Such rsrictions  n
conist of import  barriers  prevenfting  arbitrage,  but may also reflect  the non-eistenc  or non-enforcem¾
of competition  law by the exporting  country. These  constitute  reasons  why dumping  is held to be an
unfair practice. Thus, the U.S. has claimed  that lax Japanese  antitrust  enforcement  permits Japanese
fifms  to collude,  raise  prices, and  use part of the resulting  rents to cross-subsidize  (dump)  products  sold
on foreign markets.  Garten (1994, pp.  11-13) offers a representative  and thoughtful  defense of
antidumping  that emphasizes  entry barriers in the exporter's  home  market. Four major conditions  are
argued  most likely  to give  rise to dumping:  dosed home  markets  of exporters,  anti-competitive  practices
in the exporting  country  market  which  permit  export  sales  below  cost,  government  subsidization,  and  non-
market conditions  (mainly  referring  to the People's Republic  of China  and the economies  in transition).
Garten  goes on to defend  active  application  of antidumping  laws  to address  these conditions. Arguing
against  those  who  suggest  that if lack  of competition  is the problem,  competition  laws  should  be applied,
"The  Administration  supports  increased  global  standards  in the area  of competition  law  and  believes  that,
with success  in this effort, the need to invoke  the antidumping  law will be reduced. Competition  laws
can and do work  effectively  alongside  the antidumping  law, but are not a substitute  for it.  11  ' need  for
vigorous  enforcement  of the US  antidumping  law  will continue  for the foreseeable  future' (Garten,  1994,
p. 20, emphasis  added). Sole  reliance  on antitrust  measures  is rejected:  "If the low  prices  are the result
of dumping  and  the exporter  succeeds  in driving  its US  competition  out of business,  prices  could  still rise,
likely  to higher levels  than  if there  had  never been  dumping"  (Ibid.) Garten  goes  on to argue  that  another
disadvantage  of the "sole reliance"  on antitrust  laws is the questionable  effectiveness  of the US antitrust
laws in "addressing  and resolving  problems  that arise outside  the United  States  and the time-limits  chat
are not appropriate  for cases where  urgent need of protection  from unfairly  traded imports  is sought'
(Ibid.).
Antidumping  is an inferior instrument  to address  foreign market closure  as it does not deal
directly  with  the source  of the problem,  i.e., the government  policies  which  artificially  segment  markets,
or allow this to occur.  An antidumping  duty may put pressure on affected firms to lobby their
government  to eliminate  such  policies  - or to abolish  private  business  practices  that restrict  entry  - but
does so in a very indirect  manner. Once  investigations  are initiated,  any chahges  in policies  or practices
cannot  have  an impact  on the finding. Thus, the threat  of antidumping  apparently  must induce  market
opening. But, in many cases  there will not be significant  barriers  to entry, so there is not much  to be
done  by exporters  on this  dimension.  A problem  with  current  antidumping  enforcement  is that  no account
is taken of whether  price discrimination  or selling  below  cost is the result  of market access  restrictions.
Instead,  this is simply  assumed. 4 At the same  time, antidumping  creates  a large  number  of distortions. 5
The existence  of antidumping  induces  rent-seeking  behavior  on the part of import-competing  fimns,  and
4/ Of  course,  thece  aeed  be no uniform  relationship  between  market  closure  and  dumping,  as this  will  depend
on a lot of other variables.  What matters is that market closure is held to be a justification for antidumping,
i.e., is a source of 'unfaimess',  without being shown to exist.
5/ This is generally iccognized.  For example, "But unlike domestic antitrust laws, which generally increase
competition and lower prices, national antidumping laws sometimes reduce competition and raise prices.-
Economic Report of the President, United States Government  Printing Office, Washington D.C.,  1994.
4the threat of actions lead exporting firms to alter production, allocation, and production-location  decisions
X  ~~in  ways  dtha  reduce  welfare.6
Many economists that have studied the problem of antidumping  have concluded that the welfare
costs associated with the use of this instrument could be reduced if account was taken of its economy-
wide impact. The policy implication  that is often drawn is that a 'public interest' test be introduced, and
that the costs of protection be publicized.  In practice it appears that such suggestions have little effect
because of the widely held perception  that dumping is 'unfair'.  The costs of protection are consequently
heavily discountced  by policymakers, even if they are formally required to establish that action is in the
national interest.  Suggestions that international effbrts center on the adoption of public interest clauses
or more specific 'economy-wide  impact' tests run into the problem that such actions are in theory in each
country's interest.  Reciprocal negotiations  cannot strengthen thie  incentives to go down this path.  What
is required is to deal with the rhetoric of 'unfairness' first.  One possibility in this comection, discussed
further below, is to engage competition policy a-uthorities  in determining whether the exporter's home
market is contestable, and-whether dumping threatens competition in the importing country's market.
Procedual Aspects of Anuidumping  Investigations
Detailed rules have been developed in the GATT regarding antidumping.  A brief summary is
perhaps useful for those that are not familiar with the multilateial "rules of the game," as amended by
the recently concluded Uruguay round negotiations.  Dumping is defined as offering a product for sale
in export markets at a price below "normal value".  "Normal  value" is defined as the price charged by
a firm in its home market, in the "ordinary course of trade".  Trade is considered not to be ordinary if
prices are less than average tota  costs (i.e.,  the sum of fixed and variable costs of production plus
selling, geneal  and administrative  costs). 7 In the absence of sufficient sales on its domestic market, the
highest comparable  price chargtJ in third markets or the exporting fum's  estimated costs of production
plus a 'reasonable' anount for profits, administrative, selling and any other expenses is to be used to
determine normal value.'  In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities
concemed that the export price is unreliable because of a relationship or agreement between the parties
involved in a transaction, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the
fI  See, e.g., Finger (1993),  Hoekman  and Leidy  (1993),  and Messerlin  (1989  and 1990).
71 Such  sales may  be disregarded  in determining  normal  value  if the authorities  determine  that they are made
over a period  of at least 6 months, in substantial  quantities  and are at prices  which do not provide  for the
recovery  of all costs within  a reasonable  period  of time.
81  Costs  are to be calculated  on the basis  of records  kept by the exporter  or producer  under investigation,  as
long as these  follow  generally  accepted  accounting  principles  of the expordng  country  and reasonably  reflect  the
costs  associated  with the production  and sale of the product  under consideration.
5=  impored products  are first resold  to an independent  buyer, or if they are not resold  to an independent
buyer, 'on such reasonable  basis as the authorities  may  determine."
The comparison  of the export  price  and the normal  value  must be madc  at the same level  of trade
(normally  ex-factory  level),  and for the same time period. Allowance  must be made for differences  in
the conditions  and  terms  of sale,  taxation,  levels  of trade,  quantities,  physical  characteristics,  and  in costs,
including  duties  and taxes, incurred  betweea  importation  and resale.' When price comparisons  require
a conversion  of currencies,  the rate of exchange  on the date of sale must  be used.  In an investigation,
the exporters  must  be allowed  at least  60 days  to adjust  their export  prices  to reflect  sustained  movements
in exchange  rates during  the period of investigation.  The existence  of margins  of dumping  during  the
period  under  investigation  must  be established  on the basis  of a comparison  of a weighted  average  normal
value with a weighted  average  of prices of all comparable  export transactions,  or by a comparison  of
normal  value and export prices on a transaction  to transaction  basis. A normal  value established  on a
weigted average  basis  may  be compared  to prices  of individual  export  transactions  if the authorities  find
a pattern of export prices which differ significantly  among different purchasers, regions or  time
periods.1°
Actions  against  dumping  may  only be taken if it can be shown  that the dumping  has caused  or
threatens  material  injury  to the domestic  import-competing  industry  producing  a 'like' product. Injury
determinations  must be based  on positive  evidence  and involve  an objective  examination  of the volume
of the dumped  imports, the effect of the dumped  imports on prices in the domestic  mnarket  for like
products, and the impact  of dumped  imports  on domestic  producers  of such products. A significant
increase  in dumped  imports, either in absolute  terms or relative  to production  or consumption  in the
importing  country,  is a required  for finding  injury. Significant  price  undcrcutting  of domestic  producers,
or a significant  depressing  effect  on prices are other indicators  that may  be used.
De  =nimis  dumping  margins  are set at 2 percent or a volume  of imports/level  of injury that is
negligible.  Where  imports  of a product  from more  than one country  are simultaneously  subject  to anti-
dumping  investigations,  the investigating  authorities  may cumulatively  assess  effects  of such imports  if
the margin  of dumping  established  in relation  to the imports  from each  country  is more  than  de minimis,
the volume  of imports  from each country  is not negligible,  and a cumulative  assessment  of the effects  of
the imports  is appropriate  in light of the conditions  of competition  between  imported  products  and the
conditions  of competition  between  the imported  products  and the like domestic  product. An illustrative
list of indicators  is given in the antidumping  agreement  to detenmine  the impact  of dumped  imports  on
21 If price comparability has been affected, the normal  value is to be established  at a level of trade equivalent to
the level of trade of dte constructed export price, or due allowance is to be made for such factors.
101  An explanation must  be provided why such differences cannot ie  taken into account appropriately by the use
of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction  companson.
6the domestic  industry. These  include  actual  and  potential  decline  in sales,  profits,  output,  market  share,
productivity,  return on investments,  or utilization  of capacity; factors affecting  domestic  prices;  the
magnitude  of the margin  of dumping;  and  actual  and  potential  negative  effects  on cash flow,  inventories,
employment,  wages,  gronwth,  or the ability  to raise  capital.
Dumped  imports  must be found to cause  injury because  of dumping. The necessary  causality
msut be established  on the basis  of "all relevant  evidence  before  the authorities." Any  other  factors  that
are known  and that  at the same  time are injuring  the domestic  industry  must be taken into account,  and
must not be astributed  to the dumped  imports. A number  of factors  that  may  be relevant  in this respect
are noted in the Agreement,  including  the volume  and prices of imports  not sold at dumping prices,
contraction  in demand  or changes  in the patterns  of consumption,  trade,  restrictive  practices  of  - and
competition  between - the foreign  and domestic  producers,  developments  in technology,  and t^  .: export
perfomiance  and productivity  of the domestic  industry.
Th.e  term 'domestic  industry"  is defined  as the domestic  producers  as a whole  of the like  products
or to those  of them  whose collective  output  of the products  constitutes  a major  proportion  of the total
domestic  production  of those products. If producers  are related  to the exporters  or importers" or are
themselves  importers  of the allegedly  dumped  product,  the term "domestic  industry"  may  be interpreted
as referring  to the remaining  producers  of like  products.
The GATT  agreement  on antidumping  contains  rather  detailed  procedural  requirements,  relating
to initiation  of investigations;  the evidence  that can be used; transparency  of procedure;  the need  for an
appeals  option; the duration  of antidumping  actions;  and the remedies  that may  be used.  It is too far-
reaching  to discuss  all these aspects  of the Uruguay  round  antidumping  agreement. Although  the new
rales constitute an improvement  over prior GATT requirements  in this regard, they do little to
compensate  for the fact  that antidumping  authorities  retain  substantial  discretion  in applying  regulations
and defining  criteria. No requirements  were introduced  that  the narket access  conditions  prevailing  in
the exporter's  home market  be investigated,  or the threat  to the competitive  conditions  existing  on the
importer's  market  be ascertained.  While  the discretion  with respect  to methodologies  used  to determine
dumping  and injury  margins  has been somewhat  circumscribed,  this is an area where 'abuse' cannot  be
regulated  away. Many of the practices  that have been identified  as leading  to significant  protectionist
biases remain  untouched.' 2
11/ This requires  that one directly  or indirecdy  controls  the other; both are direcdy  or indirectly  controlled  by a
third person; or together  they  direcdy or indirectly  control  a third prson.  'Mere must  be grounds  for believing
that the relationship  causes  the producer  concenmed  to behave  differently  from non-related  producers.
121  For example, an apparent imprvement  from an economic welfare point of view is the new requiremeut that
antidumping  duties be terminated within five years of imposition. in practice this may not be a binding
constraint, as this is conditional  upon the findings of a review investigation  whether both dumping and injury
caused by dumped imports continues (or threatens) to persist.  Anotber example pertains to the definition of an
7There are substantial differences  between antidunping and antitrust enforcement  in this
connection. Abstracting  from the differences  in objectives,  antidumping  authorities  have  much greater
discretion than  do antitrust authorities in implementing  the respective  laws.  With respect to key issues
such  as the methodology  used  to calculate  dumping  margins,  the determination  of the grelevant'  market
(i.e, how  to define  the 'like' products  with  which  dumped  imports  are competing  and  thus  injuring),  and
how to ascertain  whether  dumped  imports  have  caused  material  injury  current  procedures  are biased  in
favor  of domestic  industry. This contrasts  with antitrust  enforcement,  where  it is much  clearer  what the
objective  of the law is and where  methodological  guidelines  have  been  developed  that are applied. An
example  is the US Department  of Justice's  Merger  Guidelines  defining  how the relevant  market  is to be
determined.
While  the GATT  Agreement  does not require  any  consideration  of the zconomy-wide  impact  of
antidumping  duties, their impact  on existing users of imports, or the involvement  of competition
authorities,  nothing in the GAIT requires  Members  to implement  antidumping  laws.  There is also
nothing  that prevents them from adopting  antidumping  laws that  give competiion authorities  a role in the
investigation  process  and makes  the imposition  of a duty  conditional  upon a finding  that this is not too
detrimental  to competition  and welfare. Some  jurisdictions  have  included  public  interest  claus  s in their
antidumping  legislation  (see below), others have given their competition  offices a  role in either
implementing  antidumping  investigations  (e.g.,  Poland),  or addressing  their  effects  eapost (e.g.,  the  EU).
Thiis  goes beyond what is required by the GATT, and reflects a recognition  that antidumping  actions are
potntialy  very costly instruments of trade policy.
111  Lessons from Regional Integration Agreements
Attempts  by countries  to negotiate the abolition of antidumping  have been made in the context
of a number  of regional  integration  agreements. The experience  obtained  in this connection  provides
valuable  information  regarding  the conditions  that are necessary  for antidumping  to be replaced  by
antir  enforcement.
'intcrested  party' in the GAiT Agreement.  This provides  uses and final  conmr  of the  import  a voice
during  the investigations,  but restricts  ther  to providing  eviden  that is relevant  to the determination  of
dumping,  or injury  to domeic  firms  that compete  with the imported  product. The fact that a duty my  i
their proper  business  is not  a factor  that GATT  members  are required  to cosider. See Hindley  (1994)  for a
more  comprensive  discssion.
jIl See Morris  and Mostller (1991),  Morris  (1993).
:European  Economic  Comnuaity
The EEC (now the European  Union)  is unique  in that it involves  the complete  liberalization  of
trade in goods, services, labor and capital (te  four freedoms).  In addition, it imposes  common
disciplines  on Member  states with res]ct  to state aids (subsidies),  govermnent  procurement  practices,
and competition  policy.  Articles  85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome  prohibit practices  that restrict or
distort competition  and abuses  of dominant  positions  insofar as they affect  intra-European  trade flows
Art.85 EEC  prohibits  agreements  and concerted  practices  - both tacit  and cxplicit,  whether  enforceable
or not - that restrict or distort competition  in the common  market and may affect  trade between  EU
member  states. A de minimis  rule has been  established  by the EC Commission  under  which  firms  with
relevant  market  shares  below  5 percent  and aggregate  annual  tumover  of less than  ECU 200 million  are
exempted  from the reach of competition  disciplines. Article 86 EEC prohibits abuse  of a dominant
position. Dominance  is determined  on the basis of the relevant  product  and geographic  markets. Art.86
contains  an illustrative  List  of abuses,  including  unfair  trading,  price disriminaton, ti-ins  or bundling,
and restricting  output  or access  to markets. Effects  on trade may  be potential,  indirect  as well  as direct,
and involve  sdtmuling as well as restricting  trade (e.g.. through  the use of cross-subsidization).
Public  undertalngs and  undertakings  to which  special  or exclusive  rights  have  been  granted  (e.g.,
monopolies),  are the subject of Article 90 EEC, which requires nondiscrimination  on the basis of
nationality  and  bebavior  consistent  with the other  competition  puinciples  and rules of the EU, insofar  as
the application  of these  rules  do not impede  the realization  of the  tasks  assigned  to the public  undertking.
State  monopolies  of a commercial  character  must also ensure  nondiscrimination  regarding  the conditions
under  which  goods are procured  and  marketed  between  EU country  nationals  (Article  37 EEC). State-
aids are considered  to be incompatible  with the common  market if they affect  trade flows. However,
generally  available  subsidies  are  permitted  in principle,  as is aid  targeted  at disadvantaged  regions  (Article
92.3(a))  (e.g., regions  with per capita  incomes  that are substaially below  average,  or areas  wbere  there
is significant  unemploymt).
One  consequence  of  the  far-renhing  liberalization/integration  of  markets  and  adoption  of common
competition  policies  was the explicit  recognition  that antidumping  actions  did not have a place in the
common  market. Article  112  of the  Treaty  of Rome  provides  for the  imposition  of antidumping  measures
on inteal  trade only during  the twelve-year  transition  period  leading  up to full implemenation  of the
Treaty.
The  European  Economic  Area  Agreement
The EEA is a fhr-reachg  agreement  between  the EFTA  states  (minus  Switzerland)  and  the EU
that  involves  the  former  adoptig much  of the EU's acomre  (the  main exception  being  the
Community's  Common  Policies  - agriimulure,  extermal  trade),  and the EU etending the four freedoms
9tothe  EFTA countries.  Art.  26 of the EEA Agreement stipulates that:  "Anti-dumping measures,
countervailing  duties and measures against illicit commercial  practices attributable  to third countries shall
not be applied in relations between the Contracting  Parties, unless otherwise  specified in this agreement."
Protocol 113  EEA limits the application of Art. 26 in two ways:  (i) the Article is only applicable to the
areas covered by the provisions of the EEA Agreement and in which the Community acquis is fully
integrated into the Agreement (an ad hoc solution was, for example, found with respect to fisheries,
-where  the Comnnmnity  acquis was not integrated); and (ii) unless EEA Contracting Parties agree on other
solutions, its application is without prejudice to any measures which may be introduced by them to avoid
circumvention of anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties or measures against illicit commercial
parties, aimed at third countries.  This restriction was judged necessary because the EEA is a free trade
:area.  It does not establish a customs union with the EU.'4
*  The FTAs  negotiated between the EC  and  the EFTA states in  the early  1970s contained
disciplines on the application of competition policy . Despite the fact that EITA  countries adopted
competition  policies similar to those of the EC, and despite the free trade status that was achieved,  [it]he
Community, however, continued its practice of imposing ani-dumping measures whenever  it considered
that an EFTA company dumped its products on the Community market arguing, inter alia, that co long
as the EFTA states and the Community did not have the same competition rules, this was necessary in
order to maintain fair competition between  Community  and EFTA companies-"` 5 Products of the former
*EFTA  countries were the subject of about 5 percent of all antidumping  actiDons  initiated by the EC in the
*1980s. Despite this relatively low incidence, the abolition of antidumping  duties in the EEA was one of
the negotiadng goals of the former EFTA countries, as their exporteis sougbt to elimnate the threat of
such actions completely (Hindley and Messerlin, 1993).
In the EEA context, as in the EU, the elimination of antidumping was accompanied by the
adoption of common competition rules (i.e., EU rules).  Moreover, the rules apply to both firms and
governments in an explicit recognition that actions on the part of both actors may restrain competition,
and  thus circumvent the objective of free trade.  That far-reaching market integration increases the
interest of governments  to adopt common competition  policies is one of the unambiguous  conclusions  that
emerge from the EUIEEA context.  A coimmon  trade policy vis-a-vis non-members was not required.
The Australia-New  ealaEnd  Closer Economic Relaions  Trade  Agreement
On January 1, 1983 the Australian - New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
(ANZCERTA)  came into force.  The Agreement aimed at integrating progressively  the econoniies of the
14/ See Norberg  et al. (1993).
151  Op.cit.. p. 390, cmphasis  added.
10two countries by establishing a free-trade area between them.  Article  12(1)(a) of the ANZCERTA
contains a legally binding obligation imposed on the two participants to: "examine  the scope for taking
action to harmonize requirements relating to ... restrictive trade practices."
Australian antitrust laws follow the US model, whereas New Zealand initially followed the UK
experience. In 1986, New Zealand's Parliament enacted  new competition legislation largely adapting its
legislation to the Australian system."  In large part these changes were driven by the desire of the new
govermnent to enhance competition in the economy.  However, they also allowed discssions  betwee
the two countries to eliminate antidumping on bilateral trade flows.  In the review of the ANZCERTA
that was completed in 1988 and resulted in the Protocol in Acceleation of Free Trade on Goods signed
August 18, 1988, this evolution was reflected in the Preanble:  ...the maintenance of anti-dumping
provisions in respect of goods originatin  in other Member States ceases to be appropriate as the Member
States move towards the achievement of full trade in goods between them" (Adhar, 1991, p. 320).  As
noted by Adhar, "The rather doctrinaire  view that removal of trade barriers would eliminate  the incative
or  scope  for  dumping was rejected.  Accordingly, policy makers seized  upon existing domestic
competition laws.  With minor amendments,  domestic antitrust could address problems of trans-Tasman
predation" (Ibid, p. 322).
In the ANZCERTA context a two-step  procedutre  was therefore followed. Full trade liberalization
was judged necessary but not sufficient to eliminate incentives  for dumping.  Such elimination required
active  enforcement of  agreed  competition laws.  The  corresponding modified  Artide  4  of  th
ANZCERTA now reads:
"1.  The member States agree that anti-dumping  measures in respect of goods originating
in the territory of the other Member States are not appropriate from time of achievement
of both  free trade in  goods between the Member Stares on  1 July  1990, and  tde
application of their competition laws to relevant anti-comptitive conduct affecting  trans
Tasman trade in good".-.  and
4.  Each Member State shall take such actions as are approprate  to  achieve the
application of its competition law by 1 July 1990 to conduct referred to in paragraph 1
of  this  Article  in  a  manner  consistent with  the  prnciples  and  objectives of  the
Agreement."
16/  Adhar (1991,  p. 332).
117The  North American Free Trade  Agreemm
Both the Canada-US  Free Trade Agreement  (CUSFTA)  and the North American  Free Trade
Agreement  (NAFTA)  liberalize  trade in industrial  products  and foreign  direct investment  flows. They
do not liberalize  trade in agricultural  products, or  discipline  the use of subsidies.  Indeed, both
agreemes simply  restate  the  existing  muldlateral  (GATT)  disciplines  and  remedies  concerning  subsidies.
Both  agrements continue  to maintain  antidunping  for internal  trade  flows. Despite  lengthy  discussions
on the topic, and  despite  the Canadian  govermnent's  great interest  in disciplining  the use of antidumping
(with  a siated preference  for abolition)  negotiators  in both instances  were unable to agree to replace
antidumping  with antitrust  enforcement. In part this reflected  differences  in the competition  rules and
their enforcement  in the member  counties.  More important  appears  to have been the strength  of the
lobbies  in the countries  involved  that supported  the continued  existence  of antidumping.
EUAgreemens  with Central ad Eastern European Countries
The recently negotiated  Europe Agreements  between the EU and six Central and Eastem
European ountries  (CEECs)  illustrate  that  free trade, a common  competition  policy, and  disciplines  on
subsidy  and related  polices is not enough. The Europe  Agreements  will lead to complete  free trade  and
freedom  of capital  flows over a ten year period. The Agreements  also foresee  in the application  of the
basic competition  rles  of the EU by the associated countries to pracc  that affe:t trade between them.
The ules relate to agreements  between  firms restricting  competition,  abuse  of dominant  position,  the
behavior  of public  undertaldngs  (state-owned  finrs) and competition-distorting  state  aids  (Articles  85, 86,
90 and 92 of the EEC Treaty respectively).  Thus, competition  policy is defined  widely  to include  the
behavior  of govements  as well as of firms.
Despite  their agreement  to adopt  EU-compatible  competition  disciplines,  and  despite  the fact  that
free trade and freedom of investment  will be achieved  within ten years, there is no provision  in the
Europe  Agreements  specifying  that antidumping  will be phased out.  Continued  threats of contimgent
protection  on the part of the EU implies  that CEEC firms  will face  different  standards  than their EU
competitors.  EU firms will be permitted  to engage  in price discimination  or sell below  cost on the EU
market, whereas  CEE firms will be constrained  in pursuing  such a strategy  by the existence  of EU
antidumping  procedures. On EU markets,  price discimination  by CEEC firms in the sense of selling
products  at prices below those  charged  at home may lead to antidumping  petitions  if this injures  EU
firms. Such dumping  is unlikely  to be the result  of concerted  practices  or abuse  of dominant  positions,
as these will be difficult  to attain  by CEEC firms. Nor can it be argued  that CEEC firms are unfairly
benefitting  from a protected  home  market.
12Necesswy Condidons  for Replacing  Anidwnping with  Andtnist
Experience  demonstrates  that  internafional  agreement  on the abolition  of antidumping  is difficult
to achieve.  Where  it has proven  possible,  it occurred  in a bilateral  or regional  setting. The  two instances
where  elimination  of antidumping  proved possible  - the EEC/EEA  and the ANZCERTA  - entail  far-
reaching  liberalization  of trade in goods, services  and  factors  of production,  coordination  and  substantial
harmonization  of competition  policies,  as well  as disciplines  on government  procurement  and state  aids
(subsidies).  In the EU context,  there are supranational  rules and enforcement  of competition  disciplines
that apply  to both firms  and govenments. This is not the case for ANZCERTA,  which  does not have
an equivalent  of the European  Commission  and the ECJ, although  it does have  disciplines  on subsidies
that are stronger than those contained  in the GATT.  The NAFMA,  in contrast, does not contain
disciplines  on subsidies  that go beyond  those  of the GATT,  does not imply common  antitrust  rules or
enforcement,  and continues  to allow for antidumping. This suggests  that  abolition  of antidumping  not
only requires  concurrent,  if not prior, agreement  to eliminate  trade and investment  restrict:ions  ('free
market access'), harmonize  - or at least coordinate the application of - competition laws and policies,
and adopt  common  disciplines  on the use of state  aids. However,  the experience  of the CEECs  illustrates
that all of this may be necessary,  but it is not sufficient.
Whatever  the case may be regarding  the sufficient  conditions  for international  agreement  to
abolish  antidumping,  clearly  a liberal  trade  and  direct  investment  policy  stance  and  active  competition  law
enforcement  are necessary  conditions.  Unilateral  efforts  to liberalize  foreign  access  to domestic  markets
for goods and services  is likely to be a precondition  for any multilateral  agreements  in this area.  Free
trade is an effective  means  of fostering  competition.  It should  help both to reduce  the probability  and
the magnitude  of dumping by exporters, and provide goverments with arguments  to oppose the
application  of antidumping  actions  against  their exporters. Perhaps  somewhat  less obviously,  but again
supported  by the regional  experience,  liberalization  should  extend  to the service  sector. In practice,  this
implies  a liberal  foreign  direct investment  polky, and the application  of the national  treabnent  principle.
Perceived  restrictions  on access to distribution  channels  and related  services are often held to be a
jusfification  for the imposition  of antidumping  measures.
IV.  A Three-stage  Approach for Addressing  Unfair Trade Allegations
Unilateral  liberalization  of access  to markets  cannot  guarantee  a significant  fall in the incidence
of antidumnping  harassment. Even economies  such as Singapore  and Hong Kong are subjected  to
antidumping  by OECD countries. More is needed. Freer trade and a liberal FDI stance  will at best
increase  lobbying  against antidumping  in export markets,  and hopefully  filitate  the negotiation  of
agreements  to discipline  antidumping. That is, it is a necessary,  not a sufficient  condition. Vigorous
enforcement  of domestic  antitrust  laws  could, in principle,  help, but again is unlikely  to be sufficient.
Even if it were desirable  and politically  feasible,  harniztion  of competition  laws in the multilateral
13context, may also be  msfficient,  as demostred  by the Europe Agremens.  An atmpt  can be made,
however,  to enhance  the role of competition  policy disciplines  in the trade policy  context  by seeldng
multilateral  agreement  on a very limited  number  of common  standards.  Political  realities  will require  chat
the antidumping  option be maintained  in the immediate  future.  But, it might be possible  to make
-antidumping  just one of a number  of available  remedies.  In what follows  a three stage process is
proposed,  of which  only the first stage  is new.
Stage  1:  Applying AntiusttLegislazion
If an import-competing  industry  believes  that a foreign firm or firms is engaging  in injurious
dumping,  under  curent rules it may  request  its govermnent  to launch  an antidumping  investigation.  The
focus  of this investigation  is to determine  whether  dumping  occurs,  and if so, if it materially  injures  the
domestic  import-cmpeting  industry  producing  like products. As noted earlier, a major weakness  of
antidumping  enforcement  is that no attempt is made to determine  whether there is any injury to
coMpetition,  i.e., to national  welfare. Moreover,  although  ostensibly  justified  because  of market  access
restrictions  in the exporters  home  market  (see, e.g., Garten, 1994),  this is also not a criterion. Instead
of automatically  initiating  an antidumping  investigaton  upon receipt  of a complaint,  it is proposed  that
governments  agree that an allegation of ingurious  dumping lead to  consultations  between - and
investigations  of - the relevant  competition  authorides.  If a necessary  condition  for 'unfair' dumping
by a firm is market  segmentation  and/or  market  dominance,  as argued  by defenders  of antidumping,  then
an attempt  should  be made  to determine  whether  this is the case. Vigorous  enforcement  of the antitrust
laws of both the exporting  and importing  country should, in principle,  do much to ensure that the
perceived  precondition  for dumping to  be 'unfair' (market power/closure  at home or  abroad) is
satisfied. 
17
The first question  to be addressed  in this context is whether  the interested  parties have an
incentive  to have  recourse  to an approach  based  on anttrust enforcement  rather  than  pursuing/facing  trade
remedy  protection. From the exporting  country's  point of view, the alternative  of being subjected  to
antidumping  investigation/duties  is clearly much less attractive  than the enforcement  of  its own
competition  laws.  The latter will raise its welfare, the former will lower it.  From the importing
country's  point  of view,  investigation  and  imposition  of antidumping  duties  is clearly  an inferior  remedy.
As mentioned  earlier, an antidumping  duty does nothing  to offset  the barriers  to contesting  the foreign
market. Indeed,  an antidumping  investigation  does  not even  establish  whether  such access  restrictions
exist. Inportant  in this connection  is the likelihood  that interests  of exporting  finns and the economy  as
a whole  will diverge. If the domestic  market  of the exporting  industry  is not contestable,  the industry's
rents associated  with market segmentation  may be lower than the costs to consumers  of the goods
17/  It should  be emphasized  again  that  the arguments  of proponents  of antidumping  are taken  as given. Clearly
unfairness  is a subjective  notion,  and  is often  used  as a fig  leaf. In pnnciple,  market  power  in the  home  market
may  or may  not  give  rise  to dumping.  The  issue  at hand  is to deal  with  the  percpion of 'unfairness'.
14produced. That is, welfare  will be reduced.  The exporter's  goverunent should  therefore  support  the
enforcement  of its competition  laws  in  these circumstances.  Similarly,  the importing  country  government
has an interest in ensuring that an antidumping complaint is not sinply  being used by the domestic
=,  industry  as a mechanism  to create  or enforce  a cartel  or similar  non-competitive  market  structures.' 8
Given  that  it is in the interest  of both the parties  to seek  enforcement  of antitrust  laws, the main
issue is which  antitrust  laws  are to be enforced. In anttrust case-law,  initially  in the US  and then  in the
EU, the "effects"  doctrine  has led  to an expansion  of the reach  of domestic  jurisdictions  when  addressing
antitrust  issues. Summarzing,  under  the 'effects" doctrine,  domestic  courts  have  jurisdiction  to judge
actions  of foreign  parties  to the extent  that  the latter  have  a direct, immediate  (or reasonably  foreseeable)
and substantial  effect on the market of the importing  country. These three conditions  can be (and in
practice  have  been)  stretched  to encompass  actions  that  could  be, at best, described  as borderline  cases.' 9
This  approach was exemplified by  the  Bush Administration: "Applying the  antitrust laws to
anticomptitive conduct  that harms U.S. exports  is consistent  with [previously  followed]  enforcemen.t
policy ...  Congress  did not intend the antitrust laws to be limited to cases  based on direct harm to
consumers. Today,  when both imports  and exports  are of importance  to [the US] economy,  we would
not limit our concern  to competition  in only halt of our traie. "2  The ainton Administation  appears
to follow the same approach. Assistant  Attorney  General  Anne Bingaman  recently "reaffirmed  the
Department of Justice's policy to take enforcement action against foreign conduct that falls within the
jurisdictional  reach of the Sherman  Act, even  where the restraints  do not hav{e  a direct impact  on US
consumers. 21
Recendy,  a proposed  bill was introduced  for discussion  in the US Congress  which  would  give
the President  new powers  to take action  to open foreign  markets.  The proposed  Bill  would  add a new
Section  311 to the existing  Section  301  of the 1974  Trade  Act (as modified  in 1988). Under  Secion 311
"(a)  The President  shall have  the authority  to impose  civil  penalties  on foreign  or domestic  persons  that
engage  in restrictive  business  practices, including  price-fixing,  bid rigging,  joint restint  on output,
181  As has been noted  by Messerlin  (1990),  in practice  firms  have used  antidumping  as a cartel  enforcement
mechanism  in the EU context. Wood (1989)  and Boltuck  and Kaplan  (1993)  argue  that many  US antidumping
cases are attempts  by US firms to protect rents, i.e., to main  supra-competitive  prices  that result  from
imperfectly  contestable  makers.
19/ In 1983,  the Antitrust  Division  of the US Justice  Department  recommended  criminal  prosecution  against
Japanese  trading  compaies that had allegedly  reached  agreements  concering how much US seafood  they  would
buy and at what prices. See Davidow  (1993)  for a discussion  of the United  States  v. C. Itoh & Co. case and its
influence  on the  rent  US administration.
20/ Stament  by James  Rill, Assistant  Attoney-eal,  Antitrust  Division,  as cited by Ohara (1994,  p. 50).
21/ buemarional  Trade  Reporter,  11, 1994,  p. 374.
22/ See H.R. 4206, 103d  Congress,  2nd Session.
15mnarket  allocation, boycotts,  ting  anangements  or similar activities, when such practices foreclose United
States exports or otherwise burden or restrict United States foreign commerce.... and]  (e) Civil penalties
imposed by the President pursuant to this section shall be levied against the United States business
operations of foreign or domestic persons found to have engaged in restrictive business practices under
this section and shall be commensurate  with the degree of financial injury arising out of the foreclosure
of exports or  other burden or  restriction on  United States commerce." 23 This proposal  opts for
government-to-private  business remedies, arguably to avoid potental inconsistency with GATE rules.
Irrespective  of the GAIT,  the  proposed legislation  clearly  applies US standards  extraterritorially, although
it is unclear whether the assessment of the President is to be based on the domestic (US) antitrust laws.4
Whatever the case may be in this regard, if enacted, the proposed Bill will allow the President to impose
sanctions on US subsidiaries  of foreign  companies when it has been determined  under US law that private
actions of the parent company on foreign soil foreclose US exports.  Such assertion of jurisdiction
arguably goes against the rulings of public international  law (see below).
In the United States, some courts have based their jurisdiction completely on the  "effects"
doctrine. Other courts have used it only as a first step to assert jurisdiction, considerations of traditional
(negative) comity coming into play as a second step before jurisdiction is definitely asserted.?  In the
EU the situation is slightly different.  In the Dyesruffs  case,'  the Advocate  General stated in his opinion
that it is compatible with international law to assert jurisdiction if an act committed abroad has direct,
immediate and substantial effects witin  the Community's territory.  Although his opinion was not
followed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), it was later largely espoused in the Wood Pulp case.'
Sir Leon Brittan masterfully draws the parallelism between this case and the judgment of the Permanent
Court of Interational  Justice in the Lotus case with respect to assertion of jurisdiction.
Ensuring that the three necessary conditions of the effects doctrine are met guarantees a sensible
approaE.h  towards asserting iurisdiction.  In the case of applying competition laws in the unfair trade
context, the subject of investigation  will be the contestability  ofdthe  relevant  market in both the importing
231  Ibid.
241  This could  be important,  as the US antitrust  laws  tend to be lenient  with respect  to vertical  arrangements,
and many  of the examples  cited are vertical  in nature.
25/ See Meessen  (1989)  and Atwood  (1993).
261  Court  of Justice,  Case 48169,  ICI v. Commission,  1972,  ECR, 619; Case 52169,  Geigy  v. Commission,
1972,  ECR, 787;  Case 53169,  Sandoz  v. Commission,  1972,  ECR, 845.
271  The version  of the effects  doctrine  that was espoused  was somewhat  more  restrictive  in that the
implementation  within  the territory  of the Community  of a foreign  conduct  was  required. See van Gerven
(1O).
28J  See Brittan  (1991,  pp. 11-12).
16£  > g  and exporting  country. Whether  or not exporting  firms  will dump  depends  not only on the existence  of
nmarket  access  restrictions  in their home  market  and  the structure  of the market,  but also  on the situation
in the  market  of the importing  country.  Whether  dumping  is injurious  to competition  depends  importantly
on the market  structure  prevailing  in the importing  country. Accordingly,  in the dumping  context,  at
least  one  criterion  (direct  effect)  and  most likely  another  one (immediate  or reasonably  foreseeable  effect)
of the "eff:cts"  doctrine  are not met. It therefore  seems  unreasonable  to argue  that  the authorities  of the
importing  country  can assert  jurisdiction  over barriers  to entry  in the market  of the exporting  country,
and consequently  apply  their own antitrust  laws based  on the "effects"  doctrine. In the absence  of a
world  competition  law, the only law that is applicable  under an interpretation  of the effects  doctrine  that
is compatible  with international  public  law and able  to address  the issue  of foreign  market  structure  and
conduct  is the competition  law of the exporting  country. Domestic  market  structure  and conduct  in the
importing  country should  be the focus of  its own competition  authorities. Interpreting  the "effects
doctrine" as allowing  the importing  country's antitrust authority to apply its legislation  to practices
prevalent  in the exporting  country  that might  give rise to dumping  (and thus produces  its effect  on the
market  of the importing  country)  is to stretch  the concept  to an unreasonable  extent. Such  an approach
sanctions  the existence  of situations  potentially giving rise to dumping,  rather than the conduct  itself.
Attention  should  therefore  focus  on  obtaining  agreement  that each  country  applies  its compettion
policies  to the actions  of firms  located  in their  respective  territories. The principle  of positive  comity  can
prove useful in implementing  competition  policy-based  investigations  in the unfair trade context. The
notion of 'positive  comity' appears  alongside  'traditional' comity  in the September  1991 cooperation
agreement  in antitrust  between the EU and the US."  According  to the traditional  conmity  principle,
sovereign  states  will consider  important  interests  of other states  when exercising  their own  jurisdiction
(Art.!!  of the agreement).  'Positive  comity' shifts  the initiative  to the state  whose interests  are affected,
which  is given  the legal  option  of requesting  another  state  to initiate  appropriate  enforcment proceedigs
if this could  address  the complaining  country's  concerns." While  it clearly  goes  beyond  the taditional
principle  that is embodied  in the OECD Recommendations, 3'  the ultimate  decision remains at the
291 Agreement  Between  the Gvernment of the USA and the Commission  of the EC Regarding  the Application
of Their Competition  Laws,"  Intrntional  Legal  Marerials,  XXX, 1991,  pp. 1491-1502.  See, e.g., Ham
(1993)  for a discussion.
30! Ar.V:2 of the agreement  staes:  'If a Party  belvs  that anticompetitive  acdvities  carded out on the
teiritory  of the other Party are adversely  affcting its mportant interts,  the first Party may  notify  the other
Party and may request  that the othar  Party's competition  authorities  initiate  appropriate  enforceent  activities."
311  The 1986  OECD  Recommendation,  which  replaced  the 1979  Reco  ion  and purports  to strengthe
international  cooperation  in this field, encourages  OECD  members  to give effect  to the princple of traditional
comity.
17discretion  of the state  asked  to act. This  principle  has begun  to find  wider  application  in the international
sphere  (Hoekman  and Mavroidis,  1994b).32
How might  the process  work? Upon receipt  of a request  to start an antidumping  investigation,
the relevant  authorities  (e.g., DG-1  in the EU context,  the Department  of Commerce  in the US) would
inform  the competition  authorities  of the exporter's  home market  that a petition  has been  received  and
request  then to undertake  an investigation  into  the contestability  of the relevant  market. The aim  of the
investigation  would be twofold:  (1) to collect data on the prevailing  market stmcture, extent of
competition,  and regulatory  environment;  and (2) to determine  whether  the exporting  finn has engaged
in anticompetitive  behavior  or has a dominant  position  which  it has abused  by restricting  enty.  Both
aspects  are important.  The investigation  will document  all relevant  government  measures  that affect  the
structure of the  market:  tariffs, non-ariff measures, subsidies, monopolies,  preferential  tax or
procurement  treaument,  barriers  to foreign  direct investment,  and so forth. The investigation  will also
seek to detemine whether  private  agreements  have  been concluded  to restrict  competition,  or whether
the firms  have  and abuse  a dominant  position. Throughout  the investigation,  the competition  authorities
of the importing country  Imst be kept fully informed and be given all the information  that is collected.
Agreement  might  be sought  that  a representative  from the iWportng  country's  antitrust  office  participate
in the proceedings. Strict  time-limits  must be agreed  and adhered  to, so as to facilitate  the acceptance
of the new procedures  by the lobbies  that support  antidumping.
Concurrenty  with  the investigation  by the  competition  authorities  of  the exporter's  home  country,
symmetry  suggests that the importing  country's competition  authorities  also detenrine whether its
domestic  marIket  is competitive,  and  whetherthe  imposition  of trade  barriers  would  endanger  competition.
As  noted earlier, often import-competing  industries  that file antidumping  petitions may not be
competitive,  the underlying  objective  being  to maintain  rents. Application  of competition  tests  is clearly
in the power of each imporing country to implement  unilaterally. No multilateral  agreements  are
required.  The fact that few counties involve their competition  offices  in antidumping  enforcement
illustrates  the power of the rietoric of allegations  that dumping is "unfair.'  The application  of
competition-based  remedies in tht home nurkets of exporters - if deemed appropriate  - may help to
reduce  the extent  to which  dumpig is deemed  to be 'unfair', and induce  governments  to more actively
involve  their competition  offices  in the application  of contingent  protection.
The competition  authorities  generally  have  substantial  powers  to act on an  x post basis against
the effect  of  government  regulations  tiat restrict  competition.  If the conclusion  of  the investigaion  is that
competition  has been artificially  restricted  in a manner  that violates  the law, stadard renedies will be
321  Some  have expressed  concern  over the efficiency  of this instrument. Atwood  (1993)  points out that the
effincy  of the whole  mechanism  largely  depends  on the self-interest  of the parties. Clearly  bargaining  power
will also be important. As far as the subject  at hand is concered, however,  it can  be argued  that there  is a
coincidence  of interests  between  exporfting  and importing  countries  to initiate such  proceedings  (see above).
18employed. What these are will depend  on the wording  of the law and on practice. Irk  many  instances
the competition  office  may  fmd  that  the  law has not  been  violated  and that  there are no significant  barriers
to entry for foreign products.  In such cases the transparency/information  generating  aspect of the
investigation  is crucial.  The main point to emphasize  is that if the importing  country's competition
authorities  agree  that is no significant  closure  of the market,  the antidumping  petition  will be closed. The
same occurs if a violation of the law is found to have occurred, standard remedies are applied to
counteract  this, and these  are judged  satisfactory  by the importing  country's competition  authorities. If
no disagreement  arises, then clearly  the process has been substantially  more useful  than the classical
recourse  to antidumping  duties:  the grounds  for dumping  have either  been eliminated,3  or it has been
concluded  that a necessary  condition  for dumping  to be injurious  to competition  has not been  satisfied.
It should  be noted  that  the proposed  approach  towards  introducing  competition  policy  disciplines
consists  of a series  of procedural  obligatirns. There is no call for any  harnonization  of competition  laws
and  policies. Although  agreement  on'miimu  standards'  and  applicable  remedies  could  make  the  whole
process more efficient,  this is not necessary. However,  nonharmonization  will certainly  imply that
parties can be expected  to disagree. For example,  the outcome  of the investigation  by the exporting
firn's competition  authorities  may be contested  by the importing  country  because  certain  practices  that
restrict  entry are legal  under the exporter's  competition  law. Alternatively,  even  if a practice  is judged
illegal  and  action  is taken,  the applicable  remedy  may  be judged  to be unsatisfactory. It is important  that
not  all findings  by the exporting  firm's competition  office  be contestable,  as otherwise  the implementation
of the proposal  will be of little value. Thus, it is important  that the importing  country's compeihion
authorities  disagree  with their foreign  counterparts,  and do so on the basis of facts  and arguments  that
concern  the impact  of the exporter's  market  structure/conduct  on competition  in the importing  country's
market. It is this that should  arguably  be the 'important  interests'  that the principle  of positive  comity
revolves  around (see above).
Three possible  types  of disagreements  can be identified: (1) a number  of policies  or practices
are identified  that  restrict  the contestability  of the market  and enhance  the market  power  of the exporting
firm, but no action  can be taken  by the authorities  under the existing  law (e.g., the practices  have  been
exempted  on the basis of an efficiency  defense);  (2) there is no disagreement  regarding  the exstence of
an anticompetitive  practice, but the importing country's government  perceives that the remedy is
ineffective  in terms of dealing  with  the problem;  and (3) there is disagreement,  based  upon  the conmmon
fancs  tla  llave  been  collected,  as to whether  the contestability  of the market  is significantly  impeded  by
private/government  actions.  In these cases the importing  country  must be able to pursue the matter
finther.
331  If  the exporter's  law  provides  for compensation  or pecuniary  remedies  these  will  go  to  the importing
government.  The  latter  may  or may  nor  pass  on the  funds  to the petitioning  firm.
19Two options  will be available  to the govenment of the importing  country: a non-violation
complaint  to GATT,  and the initiation  of antidumping  proceedings.  What  is inportant in this connection
is that the investigaton  by the competition  authorities  will have  largely  determined  the facts  of the case,
generaidng  information  regarding  market  structure  and market conduct  in both the exporting  and the
importing  market. A non-violation  complaint  under  GArT rules is always  open to GATT  members. All
that is required  is that  the necessary  conditions  have  been  met (see  below). However,  the initiation  of
antidumping  will be conditional  upon the prior investigations  by the respectivc  competition  authorities.
Ideally,  a finding  that  the contestability  of the exporter's  home  market  is limited  by either  government
policies  (trade or other) or private  business  practices  that are tolerated  by the govenment  should  be a
necessay condition  for initiating  antidumping  proceedings.  That  is, the first  of the three  possible  reasons
for disagreemenit  noted above should  apply.  Non-violation  is the appropriate  path for the other two
possibilitiesa.3
Stage 2:  Non-Wolation  comlantys
The main forum  for disputes  where  no specific  GATT  Articles  are violated  is a so-called  non-
olaon  complaint  under GATT Article XXII:(b).35  Non-violation  complaints  were designed to
address  the concern  of contracting  parties  relating  to modification  of negotiated  competitive  conditions
(based  on  tariffconcessions)  through  subsequent  government  action  in areas  that  were  either  not  addressed
by the GAIT or did not violate  a GATT  obligation. For anticompetitive  practices  to be the subject
matter of a non-violation  complaint  three  conditions  must be met: (i) the measure  must be applied  by a
government;  (ii) it must alter previously  negotiated  competitive  conditions;  and (iii) the measure  could
not have  been reasonably  anticipated  at the tine the market  access  conditions  were negotiated. Article
XXIII:l(b) speaks of the 'application  of any measur'  that mnllifies  or impairs benefits.  The term
'measure' suggests  that not only formal laws and regulations  are included  but also other forms of
government  action  that are necssary to make  the goverment choice  operative. The mere tolerance  by
a govermment  of a private business  practice is unlikely  to be sufficient  grounds for a non-violation
complaint. However,  if such  tolerance  is reflected  in a positive  (specific)  action,  the first criterion  will
be satisfied.  An example  could  be an exemption  by the competent  antitrust  authorities  granted  to private
enterprses that efectively reduces  market access opportunities  for products of third countries  by
establishing  difficult  to penetate distribution  channels.  In such  cases,  if the action  (exemption)  could  not
have  been  reasonably  anticipated  at the time  market  access  conditions  were  negotiated,  a contracting  party
might  bring  a non-violation  complaint.  Passive  tolerance  of a private  business  practice,  to the extent  that
3/  in practice,  of course,  this may  be impsible  to negotiat.  If antidumping  remains  an opon  under all
three scenrios, the antidumping  authorities  sboud be reqpired  to publish  the results  of the investigaion  by the
compeddn aumitics.
M5 For a compvrhnsive  discussion  of non-violation  in the competition  contxt, see Hoekman  and Mavroidis
(1994a). Ths  ion  largdy draws  on that pape.
20it nullifies  or impairs  ablihed  competitive  conditions,  can  also give  rise to a non-violation  complaint,
and this  independently  of the legal  action  that might be taken  on the domestic  plane.
The content  of the tern  'reasonable  expectations'  has not been interpreted  in GATT case-law.
Panels  tend to follow  a case-by-case  approach. Indeed,  one can question  whether  it is appropriate  at all
to define  specific  criteria  determining  the reasonableness  of expectations.  The answer  could  be provided
through  a procedural  rule:  if 'failing evidence  to the contrary' is always  to be interprcted  as a shift of
the burden  of proof  on the contracting  party trying  to reject  the argument  that something  was reasonably
expected,  then 'reasonable  expectations'  will be perceived  to be always  present  and therefore  protected
when a concession  is negotiated,  unless the contracting  party that allegedly  modified  the value of the
concession  provides  evidence  to the contrary. If the term 'evidence'  is given  its ordinary  meaning,  then
tihe  imposed  standard  of proof  on the contracting  party invoking  the unreasonableness  of expectations  is
high.  The substantive  content  of the term 'reasonable  expectations'  can therefore  be argued  to be of
secondary  importance,  since  these  exist  until proven  unreasonable.  If this interpretation  is accepted,  the
onus  will be on the contracting  party  that  alters the value  of the  concession  to show  that  at the time it was
negotiated  serious  reasons  should  have  led the other contracting  party to believe  that the agreed  level  of
competitive  conditions  would  eventually  be reduced  (modified  negatively  in the fture).
Special  provisions  on remedies  in cases  of non-violation  complaints  have beev included  in the
Understanding  on Rules  and Procedures  governing  the Settlement  of Disputes  as a result  of the Uruguay
Round  Agreements  signed at Marrakesh  the 15 April 19942'  Article 26.1(b) of the Understanding
stipulates: "where  a measure  has been  found  to nullify  or impair  benefits  under,  or impede  the attainment
of objectives,  of the relevant  covered agreement  without  violation  thereof, there is no obligation  to
withdraw  the measure. However,  in such cases,  the panel  or the Appellate  Body  shall recommend  tha
the member  concerned  make a mutually  satisfactory  adjustment". Article  26.  1(d) of the Understanding
furte  stipulates: "notwithstanding  the provisions  of paragraph  1 of Article 22, compensation  may be
part of a mutually  satisfactory  adjustment  as final setdement  of the dispute"."  Since there is no
obligation  to withdraw  the non-violating  measure,  any satisfactory  adjustment  will concem  a different
subject-mater; this is a case  of cross-compension.
Stage  3: Antidunping
According  to the current  GATT  Antidumping  Agreement  (see  Section  II above),  three  conditions
have  to be met for contracfting  parties to be allowed  to impose  antidumping  duties: (i) existence  of
-36 Sce  GATr (1994).
371  Paragraph  1 of Article  22 states  that compensation  is a tempwoary  measure  available  in the event that
recommendations  and rulings  ae not implemented  withi  a reasonable  pcriod  of time and that they shoud not
be pmfrned to fUll  imp  of rulings  or  ind  of the adjudicating  bodies.
21dumping; and (ii) dumping causes  material injury to the domestic industry.  Two options exist as far as
the introduction  of competition  concerns in antidumping  enforcement  is concerned.  The first is to do
nothing and simply to apply what has been negotiated  during the Uniguay round.  The second is to
attempt to agree on the introduction  of criteria that make the application  of antidumping  more sensitive
to competition considerations. Common sense suggests that efforts should concentrate on agreeing to
Stage 1, and that dis  is likely to be difficult enough without seeking to change the criteria that are
employed by antidumping authorities.  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, making antidumping more
sensitive to competition  concerns  is something  that is in the interest of any administering  country. The
problem is a political economy one, in that the power of the lobbies supporting a narrow injury-to-
industry focus outweighs that of those who bear the burden of this.  It is not clear how introduction  of
this issue on the multilateral agenda will help overcome  this constraint.
On the understanding  that changing the criteria used in the antidumping context to be more
competition-sensitive  is a domestic issue, it is nonetheless  useful to identify  a number  of options that are
available to governments that seek to lessen the protectionist bias of GATT-consistent  antidumping
mechanisms. The basic idea is to shift the focus from injury to competitors  (i.c t-o  te  domestic industry
producing the like product) to injury to competition (i.e to the economy  of the importing country as a
whole). 3B In principle, antidumping  duties should be imposed  only if a cost/.bnefit analysis determines
that the advantages created by the imposition of duties for the economy as a  whole outweigh the
disadvantages. Three avenues can be explored in this context.
(1)  Pblic interest  clause. Some countries have adopted  so-called  public interest clauses  in their
antid&nping  legislation. Although  they  differ across  jurisdictions,  public interest clauses  generally  require
38/ This may  require  changes  in domestic  legislation.  A relevant  judgement  in this connection  was  given  by the
US Court of Intenational  Trade  in the case  of USX  Corporation  against  the US International  Trade
Commission,  Math  15, 1988,  682 Federal  Supplement  pp. 60-76. In the USX  case US domestic  steel
producers  challenged  a final  negative  injury  determination  by the USITC.  The Court  of International  Trade
examined  the so-called  'Five  factors  approach'  that had been  introduced  by Commissioner  Susan  Liebeler  in
1985  (Red Raspberries  from  Canada,  USITC  Report  1701),  and was  the  basis for the negative  finding. This
approah, which  was akin  to a predation  standard,  focused  on the existence  of: (1) large and increasing  market
shares;  (2) high dumping  margins;  (3) homogenous  products;  (4) declining  prices;  and (5) barriers  to entry  to
other  foreign  producers. The  appraoch  was very controversial.  The  Court  concluded  that US legislation
required  that an 'injury to industry'  test  be used,  not an 'injury  to competition'  test. As CIT  Court  Judge
Restani  stated  in her opinion:  '...Congress  has made  a judgement  that causally  related  injury  to the domestic
industry  may  be severe  enough  to justify  relief from lcss  thanfair  value  imports  even if from another  viewpoint
the economy  could  be said to be better  sewed  by providing  no relief (conrespondence  with Morris  Morkre).
Consequenily.  the Court  ora&red  the ITC to remand  the case. Reference  can also be made  to an attempt  by the
Fedral Trade Commission (FTC) 'assist' the USITC  in making its final determination on material injury in the
1986  case  of inports of 64K  dynamic  random  access  memory  components.  The FTC argued  in a pre-hearing
brief  before  the ITC that  although  the petitioner  (Micron  Technology)  had alleged  predation,  it was  unlikely  that
a predatory  pricing  strategy  had been  implemented  in the DRAM  market. Instead,  pricing  was  competitive.  In
1988,  Section  1328  of the Onmbus  Trade  and Competitiveness  Act 'clarified' that the ITC is nol required  to
determine  that prices  of imported  products  is predatory  (Horlick  and Oliver, 1989,  p. 31).
22that  before  duties  are imposed,  investigating  authorities  examine  the impact  this would  have  on the users
.of  the  alleged  dumped  import  and the final consumers  of goods that embody  the imports  concerned.
Economic  theory  suggests  that in the majority  of cases  disadvantages  outweigh  the  advantages.
The  practice  of  jurisdictions  that  have  public  interest  clauses  reveals  that  vaguely  defined  clauses
have  little  impact. Thus, in the case  of the EU, which  has a 'Community  interest'  clause,  it appears  that
this provision  almost  never  has led to a decision  not to impose  ditties  in instances  where  dumping  and
injury  to Community  producers  was found  to exist. One reason  for this is that no guidance  is given  to
investigators  how to weigh  the injury  to producers  against  the injury to users and consumers. For a
public  interest  clause  to be effective,  it is important  that  it allows  potentially  negatively  affected  parties
to defend  their interests  by giving  them  the opportunity  to present  their  arguments  to investigators,  and
have  the legal  standing  to do so.3  They  should  have  access  to the information  presented  by the import-
competing  industry  seeking  protection  in making  their case. Public  interest  clauses  should  come  into  play
at the same time that injury to producers  and the causal  link between  dumping  and such injury is
established.  Currently,  public  interest  clauses  are invoked  at the fin  stage of an investigation.  This
limits  their  impact  since  users  are required  to counteract  by then  well  established  evidence,  and  may  have
insufficient  tine to present  their arguments. If introduced  at a late stage, i.e., after the dumping  and
injury  to producer  investigations  are completed,  it is important  that enough  time  be given  to an analysis
of the economy-wide  impact  of imposition  of duties.
The experience  with public interest clauses  in Australia  and the EU is informativc. The
Australian  Antidumping  Authority  (ADA)  has never  made  a recommendation  on public  interest  grounds.
However,  there  have  been  some  cases  where  antidumping  duties  could  have  been  imposed,  but exporters
were given  only  a "warning".  In these  cases  the ADA  appears  to have  concluded  that taking  actior.  was
not in the public  interest. If it is brought  to the ADA's  attention  that  exports  from  a source  which  have
been given  a warning  have increased  and appear  to be dumped,  the ADA wivl  undertake  a fast-track
inquiry. This process, called the 'Sorbitol-approach",  was first used in a case involving  a chemical
product,  sorbitol,  from a number  of sources. It has also  been  applied  by the ADA  with  respect  to canaed
ham (2 companies),  automotive  lead acid storage batteries (3 companies),  polyvinyl chloride  (14
companies)  and triethanolamine  (2 companies).  Whether  tiis  'surveillance'  approach.  will have  a less
trade restrictive  effect  than  ti imposition  of a duty clearly  depends  on the reaction  of the exporters
concerned.  Evidence  drawn  from the EU context  suggests  that surveillance  of imports  c2n have  trade
restrictive  effects  (Winters,  1991).
39/ In the EU-context,  the 'Community  inters'  clause  was strengthened  in March 1994. An amendment  to the
antidumping  legislation  gives  legal standing  to consumers. It remains to be seen how  this strnngthening  will
operate  in practice  especialy  taken  into  account  the  heterogeneity/diversity  of  the  consumers  as opposed  to the
homogeneity  of the  producers.  The  recent  Peugeot  cases  brought  before  the  ECJ,  where  the  BEUC  (the  EU
consumers'  group)  played  a very  active  role,  suggests  that  there  is reason  to believe  that  consumers  will  ty to
exploit  the new possibilities  offered  to them  by the new legislation.
23The European  Union's  anidumping  legislation  also  contains  a public  interest  clause.10  Al
r exaple,  calls  for imposition  of antidumping  duties  in cases  ...where  the facts  as finally  establ
sbow  that dtere is dumpig or subsidizion during  the period  under invesation  and injury a
thereby,  and  the iues  of the Communty  cal for Commnit  intervention... t "  This  was  perceiv
be a dead  letter for a long  time.4'  Recently  however,  in a case coneeming  imports  of gum  rosir
Commission  concluded  that w...the  negative  effects  of aidumping measures  on the  users  of gum
would  be overwhelmingly  disproportionate  to the benefits  arising  from  antidumping  measures  in
of the Community  il!ustry.'  This  finding  was  motivated  by the fact  that the Community  iud
capacit of production  was limited  and that the imposition  of antidumping  duties  would result
substant  ial  icrease  in the costs of p  on for the Commindustry  tht  us  gum rosin
input. Accordinly, 'the Commission  conudes that  protective  msasures  would  not be appropria
that it would  not be in the  ity  interest  to continue  the proceeding."4 Recent  modificatioz
the EU's  antidunping legislaon  hzve sged  the position of  conumers m  antidun
ivestatios.4  These new dcvelopmems  reveal a tendency  to seek to bala  the  teres
beneciaries and injured  parties  as a result  of an evenhual  intoduction  of antidumping  duties.
The foregoing  simply  gives  users and  comnmers  of the imported  products  a voice. A step fu
wold be to redefine  the concept  of injury  used  In  investigations.  Dumping  should  then  be found  to
a negate  impact  on cn  not  just on competitors.  In  practice,  the best  way  t  cnsure  tu
is done is to use the same tes  that the compi  autioe  wld  use to detrmine  whether j
discrimination  or selling below  cost is  mpetitive  and violates  the c  tion law. Indeed
cometition authorities  could  be given  the  mandate  to undertake  such  an investigation.  An example
is the Polish  anidumping  law,  which  gives  the Antronpoly  Ofice the responsibit  of investig
llegations  of dumping. Alteratively, competition  authorities  could  be given  a veto right, havi
approve an  tidumping duty before it is put into effect. At a minimum, cmpetitioIi  offices should
the mandate  to detemine whether  adumpg  duties-  and, indeed,  trade policies  in general  - bav
to an excessive  reduction  in cometition on the domestic  marIet.
An iestng  case  decided  by the  ECJ  in 1992  explicitly  establishes  a link  between  antidum
and  antitrust. Pechiny and Exhrme are the only  processors  of calcium  metal  in the EU. Pechin
also  the sole  EU producer  of the metal. At a given  stage,  Pechiney  refised  to sWply  calcniu met
_V See  Concil Regulatio  242388,  11  Juy 1988,  Official  Joumal,  L 20911ff.Extramet, leading the latter to bring charges  against the fomer  for abuse of dominant  position. At the
same  time, Extramet  shifted  to great:  imports  of calcium  metal  from China  and the forner Soviet  Union.
This in turn gave rise to an antidumping  petition by Pechiney.  The Commission investigated,  and
imposed antidumping  duties.  Extraxet responded  with a request to the ECQ  to annul the antidumping
order because  the Commission  had not investigated  the possibility  that other factors  were damaging  the
EU industry. Specifically,  Extramet  argued  that if Pechiney  had supplied  Extramet, imports  would  have
been mch lower. perhaps even below de mdniis.  The ECJ found in Extramet's favor, annulling the
antidumping  order on the grounds that anticompetitive  practices relevant to  this context were not
addressed  before recourse  was made to antidumping  duties.4
(ii)  Defining  de minimis  requirements. According  to the current GAIT Antidumping  Agreement,
investigating  authorities  are not supposed  to take any action against insignificant  increases  in dumped
imports or insignificant  underselling. However, allowance  is made for the imposition of duties if the
cumulation  of a number  of such insignificant  exporters  causes  injury. Governments  interested  in reducing
the anticompetitive  effects of antidumping  can introduce much higher de minimis  standards  than those
required in the GAIT Agreement. A necessary  condition  for the imposition  of duties should  be that an
exporter  accused  of dumping  have a significant  market share.  Concepts  developed  and employed  in the
antitrust area can again be useful. Thus, a dominant  position  by a foreign  firm or group of firms (e.g.,
a  atel)  could be made a necessary  condition  for taldng action.
Dominance has been defined in various ways in national laws:  some states opt for a 30%
threshold, others for 40%, etc.  Some also employ three- or five-firm concentation criteria/indices.
Whatever the criteria, clearly the thresholds  used by competition  authorities  are much higher than the
u,iarket  shares required  under the GAIT Antidumpmg  Ageement.  The conept of national  treatment  is
relevant  in this connection. Foreign firms should in principle be teated identically  to their domestic
competitors. If the latter are subject  to competition  disciplines  that define dominance  in a specific way,
this should also be the criterion applied  to foreign  competition.
(iii)  Derermination  of the relevant  market. Under  the current  GATT Agreement  'the term
'domestic  industry' shall  be interpreted  as referring  to the domestic  producers  ...of the like  product". The
key therefore, to defining 'domestic  industry' is the defimition  of the like product.  If 'like product' is
defined in too strict a way, it might lead at lest to overestimation  of the effects  of dumping and
consequently  to impositions  of duties in cases where it should not.  In general, there is a need to apply
economic  analysis  and concepts,  including  basic  factors  such as cross price demand  elasticities. If on the
contrary,  the relevant  market is defined  in too broad a way, duties  will not be applied  when they should
451  Extramet  Industry  S.A. versus  Council  of the Eurpen  Communities,  (No. C-358/89),  Decision  of 11  June
1992.  pp. I-3813-3850.
251-  be.  A proper defintion of the relevant  market in accordance  with economic  considerations  should  be the
starting point of antidumping  investigations."
V.  Concluding Remarks
Proponents  of antidumping  are concerned  with the possibility  that dumping  is predatory, is unfair
because it is supported by a government  (e.g., through subsidization),  or is unfair because the exporters
involved benefit from noncontestable  home markets.  Subsidization should not be addressed through
antidumping.  This  is what countervailing duties are designed to  do.  Indeed, the mechanism of
countervailing  duties has the great advantage  over antidumping  in that it at least requires a finding that
subsidies exist, and  cause injury.  Predation and  anticompetitive  market  conduct are  issues that
antidumping  actions cannot address.  Perhaps even more important, current antidumnping  enforcement
procedures  make no attempt to detennine whether the necessary conditions  for "unfairness' have been
satisfied.
The obvious solution to the problem of antidumping, one that has been suggested at regular
intervals by economists  and trade lawyers for over 20 years, is to make antidumping  enforcement  more
consistent with competition  law enforcement. That is, the focus of attention  should become the effect of
dumping  on competition  in the importing  country's market, rather tham  its impact on the competitors  that
happen to  be located in that market.  So far,  it has proved to be impossible to sell this idea to
policymakers. A major reason for this is that many of the proponents of replacing antidumping  with
competition  enforcement  have argued that what is required is agreement  to adopt common  competition
policies.  The regional integration experience illustrates that this is unlikely to be sufficient to allow
agreement to abolish antidumping.  Free  trade, freedom to  invest, and disciplines on government
subsidies  are also likely to be required. Even then, this may not be sufficient,  witness the experience  of
the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU-context.  Achievement  of the various necessary
conditions  that are suggested  by the regional experience  in the multilateral  ccntext cannot  be expected  any
time soon.  But it might prove possible to seek agreement that greater effort be put into determining
whedtler  the conditions that are alleged to potentially give rise to "unfair trade" actually exist, before
having recourse  to antidumnping.  One way this avenue  might be pursued has been explored  in this paper.
The foregoing has assumed that govermnents seek to agree to implement the proposal in the
multilateral context, e.g., as part of a future GATT negotiation. While this would be preferable, and
should in principle  be feasible, in practice the suggested approach may be much easier to implement  in
a 'small numbers' context.  Thus, it could be pursued through bilateral agreement or in the context of
plurilateral  arrangements. There is increasingly  a perception  that many  countries  are interested  injoining
461  See, e.g., Wood  (1989),  Morris  (1993),  and Kelly  (1993).
26:regional  integration agreements such as the EU or NAFTA so as to  'safeguard' their access to the
regional  market (Hindley  and Messerlin, 1993). The review in Section  III of the experience  that has been
obtained with attempts to abolish antidwnping  in the context of regional integration  agreements  suggests
that there are at least three necessary  conditions  for the abolition  of contingent  protection: (1) free trade
and freedom of investment; (2) disciplines on  he ability of governments  to assist firms and industries
located on their territory; and (3) the existence and enforcement of competition (antitrust) legislation.
While necessary,  the Europe Agreements  negotiated  between  the EU and the CEECs iliastrates that these
conditions are not sufficient. Although the three conditions will to a very great extent be satisfied for
intra EU-CEE flows once  the Europe  Agreements  are implemented,  the antidumping  option was retained
indefinitely. Similarly, antidumping  continues  to be available  in the intra-NAFTA  context. Clearly, the
first best strategy for the CEECs is to seek the elimination  of antidumping  once the Europe Agreements
have been fully implemented. However, if this proves to be impossible, an agreement along the lines
sketched  out earlier would be a second-best  policy.  More generally,  attempts could be made to include
an explicit competition-antidumnping  link in Cooperation and Association  Agreements  that are currently
either under negotiation or in force.  Even if 'political realities' prevent the abolition  of antidumping  in
regional integration agreements, the far-reaching liberalization that tends to be achieved under them
should fcuilitate  the implementation  of the proposal in such contexts.
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